Your questions answered: How bad are things for Ukraine? Could the war spread to Europe? Would a ceasefire benefit Kyiv now?

It’s been more than 1,000 days since Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine, with both sides showing no sign of giving up.

But as Ukraine struggles to hold back the Russian advance, the conflict is still prompting many questions. Our military analyst Sean Bell is on hand to answer some of yours…

How grim are things looking for Ukraine militarily right now?
Alfie

Sean says: Firstly, I should point out that neither the Russian nor Ukrainian military share details about their dispositions, losses or morale. That means any judgement about the ebb and flow of the battle and the near-term prospects have an inevitable degree of subjectivity.

However, that does not stop us making an informed judgement based on available intelligence and briefings.

Last year, Ukraine was preparing for a much-anticipated “spring offensive”, supported by the provision of Western military equipment and training.

However, that offensive failed to make a decisive breakthrough of the Russian defensive positions, and since then Russia has seized the initiative.

This past year, Russia has made slow but steady progress in the Donbas, with Ukraine inflicting growing casualties on the advancing Russian forces.

Kyiv does not have the military mass or capability of the Russian invaders, so has been heavily reliant on Western military support to sustain its defensive efforts.

In response, Russia’s battlefield tactics have been heavily reliant on wave upon wave of infantry attacks, drawing Ukraine into a war of attrition which has inevitably resulted in growing Ukrainian casualties. This is placing a growing strain on Kyiv’s limited availability of soldiers.

Ukraine did try to relieve the pressure on the frontline in the Donbas region in August by conducting an audacious incursion into Russian territory in the Kursk region.

Although Ukraine did achieve an element of surprise, this strategy did spread its limited forces over a greater area, and Russia capitalised.

Instead of responding, Russia appeared to ignore this incursion and simply increased pressure in the Donbas, thus increasing its rate of advance.

From a purely military perspective, the current huge Russian casualty rate is not sustainable. So it would appear that Russia is simply pushing hard to optimise its negotiating position should the forthcoming change of US administration offer the prospects for some form of peace talks in the new year.

This is placing immense strain on the Ukrainian frontline, but whether this pressure is reaching a critical level is not easy to judge at this stage.

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How highly rated, or effective, are North Korean troops seen as being in military circles?
Guido

Sean says: With reports that up to 12,000 North Korean troops are undergoing training in Russia, the question as to how effective they might prove in battle is very topical.

Russia’s battlefield tactics are not subtle – but to date they have been effective.

A grinding war of attrition has seen Russia suffer an average of over 1,500 casualties a day in October, but Vladimir Putin appears reluctant to initiate another round of national mobilisation for fear of eroding his domestic support.

Instead, Putin has used mercenaries – such as the Wagner Group – to augment his regular forces, but (perhaps inevitably given the high casualty rates) recruitment of mercenaries has proven more challenging as the conflict has progressed.

By leveraging his military alliance with North Korea, Putin has been able to secure invaluable supplies of artillery shells and missiles in return for hard currency and military technology, which North Korea craves.

In the past weeks, Putin has extended this alliance to include North Korean troops, and although there are questions about their competence and capability, when it comes to soldiers in battle, quantity has a quality all of its own.

As for the “quality” of the North Korean troops, that is difficult to assess objectively. There will be the inevitable language challenges, and their unfamiliarity with Russian battlefield tactics, but the wider concern is that they are likely to be used as cannon-fodder to protect Russian soldiers.

Reports suggest that the families of those North Koreans deployed into Russia have been “detained” to ensure that their soldiers are suitably motivated to return home once the operation is complete.

The sad reality is that for many North Korean soldiers, their fate is to die on the battlefields of a distant land in a conflict that is not theirs to fight and for an unjust cause.

What use will the anti-personnel mines be on the battlefield, how long are they operational for and what is their significance?
Monkee

Sean says: The whole issue of anti-personnel mines is emotive due to their enduring legacy.

Anti-personnel mines were originally designed to kill enemy combatants, but later models were instead designed to maim, as that was judged to have a more detrimental effect on the enemy’s morale.

However, there has been widespread and growing international concern over the indiscriminate nature of these weapons. Unlike bullets and missiles, mines can remain dormant for years, with devastating consequences for non-combatants.

Each year, thousands of people suffer injuries from legacy mines, with nearly 2,000 civilian deaths last year, of which 37% were children.

As a result, there are international efforts to clear legacy minefields and also ban their future use. Despite this backdrop, last week, Joe Biden approved the donation of US anti-personnel mines to Ukraine.

After over 1,000 days of war, why did the US finally agree to the provision of this controversial weapon?

Most legacy mines (including Russian) are mechanically activated – the victim’s weight mechanically activates the fusing mechanism.

However, the US mines are electrically activated – the victim’s weight completes an electrical circuit which detonates the device.

This means that US mines are only dangerous for as long as the battery holds its charge, which is between 1-40 hours, so any mine not activated becomes harmless with the passage of time.

Tactically, mines have the greatest utility in defending against enemy attacks, as when on the offensive most forces focus on speed and momentum.

Although Ukrainian forces appeared initially to have seized the initiative with their incursion into the Kursk region in August, Russia is now massing its forces – and 11,000 North Korean troops – to push the Ukrainian forces from their territory.

Vladimir Putin appears to believe the forthcoming change of US administration might offer a window of opportunity to negotiate an end to the war. In preparation, Russia is pushing hard to maximise territory gained to bolster its negotiating position.

This is placing huge strain on stretched Ukrainian military defences, which is probably why Biden agreed to allow Ukraine to use ATACMS missiles in Kursk, and also to provide Ukraine with anti-personnel mines.

Give Ukraine is losing territory, would Trump intervening to stage a ceasefire actually benefit Ukraine now?
Kate

Sean says: Although president-elect Donald Trump has claimed that he will stop the war in 24 hours, it is not entirely clear how this might be achieved.

The most obvious options are brokering a peace deal, or imposing one.

Historically, a negotiated cessation of hostilities can be achieved when both warring parties see benefit in ending the conflict; however, with Russia maintaining momentum with its grinding war of attrition, Putin does not yet appear ready to compromise.

Trump might believe that he can impose some form of “deal” between the warring parties, but unless the situation on the frontline stabilises, or Russia achieves its military objectives, such an agreement might prove difficult to secure.

Since the US provides the majority of international military aid to Ukraine, that might provide Trump a degree of leverage over Volodymyr Zelenskyy.

However, given Russia’s current momentum on the battlefield, it is less clear what leverage Trump might have over Putin.

Although the objective of most Western leaders appears to be to stop Russia “winning”, Trump’s priority appears to be ending the conflict, regardless of outcome.

The longer the conflict endures, the greater the risk that Russia’s greater military “mass” eventually proves too much for the Ukrainian defences, which could lead to a significantly greater loss of territory to Russia.

Therefore, although any negotiated ceasefire might appear to “reward” Putin for his aggression, it could offer longer-term security for the remainder of Ukraine’s territory and allow Western support to rebuild Ukraine.

So, although the situation on the battlefield currently appears to favour Russia, both sides are making huge sacrifices every day the war continues, and eventually some form of compromise will be required to bring hostilities to an end.

If the US stops supplying Kyiv with military aid, could European countries supply Ukraine in any meaningful way for it to carry on?
Tim M

Sean says: First, I should be clear that despite the rhetoric emanating from across the Atlantic, it is not clear what Donald Trump’s strategy will actually be for Ukraine.

Although Joe Biden’s strategy appears to be to “stop Ukraine losing”, president-elect Trump’s appears to be to “end the war”.

Trump has claimed that he could end the war in 24 hours; however, he has not elaborated how this might be achieved.

He might consider that he can apply pressure through the provision (or not) of military aid to Volodymyr Zelenskyy; however, it is less clear what levers of influence Trump might have that could be brought to bear to bring Putin to the negotiating table.

At one extreme, the US could decide to stop supplying weapons, ammunition and financial support to Ukraine with immediate effect.

That might be coherent with a “US first” strategy, but could leave a very dangerous legacy for future generations to address.

Alternatively, Trump could engage with Putin in an effort to negotiate an end to hostilities, but threaten to increase US military support to Ukraine if Russia does not comply.

What is clear is that even with US support, the West is struggling to provide the level of military and financial aid required to turn the tide of the battle.

If Western support were to decline, Russia would feel emboldened, and although Europe might seek to address the financial shortfall, it would struggle to match the military aid currently provided by the US.

However, the real question is whether European nations are prepared to watch Russia prevail over Ukraine, or step up their direct involvement in support of Ukraine.

Europe has a significantly larger and more effective military capability than Russia, and could – for example – decide to impose a no-fly zone over Ukraine. This would be direct involvement in the conflict but would be a clear message to Putin that his illegal invasion of a neighbour would not be tolerated.

In short, although a change in US support for Ukraine could be difficult to resolve, there remains a variety of other options available to European countries if they want to demonstrate a robust response to Putin’s aggression.

If Russia is employing North Korean troops, why can’t European countries give troops to Ukraine – even pilots or missile battery crews or elite special forces – to help them counter the Russian aggression?
Brian74

As the war between Russia and Ukraine moves past 1,000 days, both sides are struggling to maintain the tempo of full-scale war.

Russia has ramped up its defence industrial base in an attempt to meet its military demands but has still had to turn to Iran and North Korea to secure supplies of ammunition and missiles.

Ukraine has turned to the West to supply air defence capability and also a range of weapons and ammunition to combat the Russian invasion.

However, both sides are also struggling to mobilise sufficient troops in response to Russia’s highly attritional style of warfare.

Russia has conducted a round of mobilisation but Putin appears very reluctant to repeat the process for fear of undermining domestic support for the war.

Instead, Russia turned initially to the Wagner mercenary group to bolster its land forces, which was then bolstered further by recruiting criminals into the Russian frontline.

Russia has also secured the support of thousands of international mercenaries through the provision of lucrative contracts; however, the high (and growing) casualty rates have dramatically reduced the flow of volunteers, so Russia has turned to North Korea for additional support.

Ukraine is also struggling to mobilise sufficient soldiers for its defensive requirements. Regardless of whatever measures Russia takes, the West has – to date – been reluctant to commit combatants to the war with Russia.

Putin consistently tries to frame the war as a conflict between Russia and NATO, but as Ukraine is not a member, it cannot call upon NATO for help.

There is little doubt that if the West was to get involved directly in this conflict it would overwhelm Russia’s military.

But that would be a significant escalation and there is currently limited political appetite in the West for such an option. However, if Russia was to gain momentum in the war and the prospects for Ukraine looked increasingly bleak, it is possible that individual European nations might decide to engage directly to stop Russia from prevailing.

Has the UK got a missile defence system like Iron Dome? If not, then are we utterly defenceless against hypersonic missiles?
The Scout

Ever since Iran launched a massive ballistic missile attack against Israel, there has been growing concern about the UK’s ability to protect itself against a similar attack.

Military capability is expensive: equipment must be modern, robust, survivable and upgradeable, and matched to well-trained and motivated military personnel, logistics support and a host of other supporting elements.

As a result, national investment in military capability is guided by threat – both near and longer-term – and for the past three decades there has not been a credible military threat to the UK requiring a layered air defence capability.

It is worth pointing out that if the UK were to be targeted by missiles, these weapons would have to fly over our NATO allies before getting to our island shores. Therefore, our membership of the NATO alliance provides a robust defence against such a threat.

In terms of national capability, the first requirement is to detect and track incoming missiles. RAF Fylingdales is a UK radar base and is also part of the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System. It is designed to give the British and US governments warning of an impending ballistic missile attack (part of the so-called four-minute warning during the Cold War).

In addition, the UK has 24/7 fighter-jet capability – Quick Reaction Alert – that can shoot down cruise missiles, and the Royal Navy also has missile defence capability.

During the Cold War, the UK was protected from missile attack by numerous Bloodhound missiles that were based across the country.

However, modern ballistic missiles require high-tech (and expensive) defensive capability to intercept these hypersonic weapons – this is just one example of where the lack of investment in the UK armed forces over the past 30 years has left a vulnerability.

But, with a US Patriot system costing around $1bn per unit, the UK will not be able to address this vulnerability any time soon without a step-change in investment.

Read more:
Zelenskyy suggests ‘hot phase’ of war could end in return for NATO membership if offered
Starmer makes significant shift on Ukraine
Ukrainians united against Russia as Zelenskyy looks to end fighting

Why isn’t the UK doing more to prepare its citizens for possible war with Russia, like Finland and other European countries?
Rosa

Sean says: Since the fall of the former Soviet Union, the UK has reduced its defence spending commensurate with the perceived “peace dividend”.

The UK military was still deployed to conflicts around the world, but these were wars of choice and conducted as expeditionary warfare. The UK Armed Forces deployed military power overseas and configured its forces accordingly.

Although Russia and China were “driving threats” that helped define UK military requirements, few anticipated that Russia would conduct a large-scale invasion of its neighbour.

The consequences of Putin’s unprovoked aggression in Ukraine will have profound and long-term implications for national security, well beyond the immediate geographic boundaries of the current conflict.

However, there is no quick fix to addressing 30 years of low defence spending, which is why the UK Strategic Defence Review has been commissioned to inform a fresh approach to meeting the UK’s future defence needs.

Although the UK political narrative is focused on increasing defence spending to 2.5% GDP at some stage in the future, most military experts believe that a significantly greater investment will be required to develop a credible and robust national defence strategy.

The UK needs to reconfigure its military capability – both nuclear and conventional – to enable the UK to demonstrate a credible military deterrence posture that will not only deter a potential adversary, but also ensure the UK prevails if conflict cannot be avoided.

Although this appears a worthy ambition, addressing decades of underfunding will require significant investment.

The UK fiscal environment precludes large investments in defence without making very difficult choices elsewhere – although it is worth reiterating that the number one priority of any government is the protection of its people, so investment should be prioritised accordingly.

In the near term, Russia has paid a huge price for its invasion of Ukraine and it will be several years before it has refreshed its stocks of military equipment, ammunition and personnel to enable it to pose a threat to the West.

Furthermore, nations geographically closer to Russia will undoubtedly feel an increased degree of urgency, which all contribute to UK’s layered defences.

But this only provides a very small window of opportunity for the UK to respond and rebuild its defences. Fail to pay our premiums, and we will not have effective insurance against an increasingly unpredictable and dangerous world.

What’s behind Zelenskyy’s comments that he would accept a ceasefire and lose land? Why now?
Jason

Sean says: Ultimately, the only person who knows the answer to that question is Volodymyr Zelenskyy.

However, mindful that Zelenskyy has proven very adept at leveraging international media to maintain a focus on the conflict with Russia, this most recent interview with Sky News was almost certainly not conducted “off the cuff”.

You can watch that interview in full below…

What we do know is that Ukraine is being pushed back on the frontline, its military is running short of ammunition and weapons, and the rising number of casualties is making it increasingly difficult to withstand the highly attritional Russian onslaught.

To date, Zelenskyy has made clear that he is not prepared to negotiate with Putin without some guarantees about Ukraine’s long-term security.

Under Joe Biden’s tenure, US military and financial support was provided to ensure Ukraine did not lose the war, whereas it appears that president-elect Donald Trump’s objective is to bring the war to an end.

Therefore, Zelenskyy is probably reviewing his negotiating strategy in preparation for Trump’s inauguration on 20 January.

Of note were Zelenskyy’s comments that land was significantly less important than people – and his priority was to ensure the long-term security and prosperity of the Ukrainian people.

Why is there talk of Ukraine receiving nuclear weapons? Is this true?
Joan

Sean says: After the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991, Ukraine found itself the third biggest nuclear power in the world.

The Soviet leadership had previously forward-deployed many of its nuclear weapons onto Ukrainian territory, and although the Ukrainians did not have the launch codes for these weapons, it was widely believed that Ukraine would eventually find a way to bypass these issues.

In an effort to resolve concerns around nuclear proliferation, the US, the UK and Russia agreed to guarantee Ukrainian sovereignty in return for relinquishing their nuclear arsenal.

This negotiation concluded with the Budapest Memorandum of 1994. However, less than two decades later, Russia reneged on that agreement and invaded Crimea, and the US and UK failed to take decisive action to fulfil their 1994 obligations around Ukrainian sovereignty.

If Ukraine had retained its nuclear weapons at the end of the Cold War, it is very unlikely that Russia would have considered a full-scale invasion in 2022.

Following Russia’s decision to forward-deploy nuclear weapons into Belarus last year, a precedent has been set and it raised the prospect that the West might consider a similar deployment of nuclear capability into Ukraine.

Although such a move would be seen by Russia as a clear escalation, it could have provided Ukraine with the ultimate deterrent against further Russian aggression.

However – and this is a significant caveat – to my knowledge there has been no further move to enact such a deployment.

Unlike Russia’s clear provocation by forward-deploying nuclear weapons into Belarus, the West appears to be looking at more measured ways to help Ukraine.

Is there a threat of European war?
Piotr

Sean says: In short, although there is always a faint risk of escalation, the short answer is that the threat of a European escalation is very, very slim.

Although we had assumed before Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022 that it had a credible and dangerous military capability, it has struggled to overcome Ukraine and has lost a significant proportion of its military equipment and capability over the last two years.

As a result, it will be several years before Russia has rearmed and is ready to present a significant threat to a much stronger European continent.

However, if Putin believes that the benefits of future military action outweigh the risks, he is likely to feel emboldened to continue his aggression.

Is NATO membership the safety net it used to be now Trump is coming in? Would he sanction a war with Russia if it attacked Estonia for example?
Gary P

Sean says: Although president-elect Donald Trump has made several comments in advance of his inauguration on 20 January next year, it is not yet clear how these ideas will be reflected in future US policy.

NATO remains a very powerful and credible military capability and serves as a deterrent to would-be aggressors.

It has proven incredibly effective at ensuring the protection of NATO members for many decades and continues to attract new members.

Although NATO represents a very powerful military capability by mass, its weakness is that it is a “coalition of the willing” and as we have seen during the Ukraine war, each nation has a very different appetite for risk.

And, Trump is likely to be focused on China and leave Europe to take more leadership in dealing with the Russia threat.

However, that does not mean that the NATO alliance is any less credible, and I suspect Trump will provide greater clarity over his intent following his inauguration.

Should the Kerch Bridge be continually attacked to disrupt Russian supplies?
Billy

Sean says: Earlier on in the conflict, many military experts believed that Crimea represented a “centre of gravity” for Vladimir Putin – something he would never accept losing.

Therefore, if Ukraine had been able to isolate Crimea and potentially seize it back from Russian occupation, Russia could be minded to negotiate an end to the conflict in terms favourable to Ukraine.

The Kursk road/rail bridge would have been a prime target as this was a primary arterial logistics route for Russia.

However, since that time Russia has secured most of the land bridge from Russia to Crimea and is therefore significantly less reliant on the Kursk bridge for logistic support to Crimea and its occupying forces.

As a result, mindful that Ukraine is short of munitions, the bridge is probably not a priority for Ukrainian targeting at this time.

Given Putin’s nuclear threats are meaningless, should we consider giving Ukraine even more powerful weaponry beyond ATACMS?
Mark in Leeds

Sean says: Since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, the West has provided military and financial support.

However, throughout that time the West has tried to balance support to Ukraine with the threat that the war would escalate into an East vs West battle with significant consequences.

There has been significant political sensitivity over the level of support provided to Ukraine, but this nervousness has served to embolden Putin.

Putin knows that his ambitions in Ukraine could not be achieved if the West were to engage in the conflict – Russia has struggled to overcome Ukraine, which has a fraction of the military capability available to NATO.

However, this reluctance to engage will be perceived as a weakness by Putin – and also by aligned nations such as Iran, North Korea and China.

History suggests that bullies only respect strength – they exploit weakness.

Nobody wants to see the war escalate further, but appeasement is almost certainly not the best way to avoid such an outcome, especially in the long-term.